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A perennial question in macroeconomics is why business cycles exhibit asym-
metry. Slow and gradual expansions, contrasted by prompt and sharp con-
tractions have been considered a key stylized fact of the business cycle by
such early contributors as Pigou (1926), Mitchell (1927), and Keynes (1936).
One strand of the theoretical literature argues that procyclical learning, in
the form of more or better information in booms than in recessions, is the
main force behind the observed asymmetric dynamics.1 The idea is that in
an environment where agents hold only imperfect information about the cur-
rent state of the economy, upon a state change, procyclical learning induces
only small upward revisions in agents’ beliefs during recessions, but large
downward revisions during booms. This pattern of learning triggers a quick
response on part of the agents when the state switches from a boom to a
recession, but only a slow response when the economy transits from a re-
cession to a boom. Despite that explanation’s intuitive appeal, two, so far
unanswered, questions remain. First, is procyclical learning optimal when
ﬁrms are allowed to choose their information? Second, how does information
contained in equilibrium prices affect learning? To address these questions,
we develop an equilibrium model of costly information acquisition and study
optimal learning in booms and recessions.2
Our paper is most closely related to the literature concerned with pro-
cyclical learning as the source of asymmetric business cycles. Chalkley and
Lee (1998) study a binary state, binary action model of capital utilization
with imperfect information about the economy’s state. In their model, due to
risk aversion, investors require more precise information to choose the high
than the low action, the latter constructed to be the safer choice. Hence, noise
investors, whose actions are independent of their belief about the economy’s
state, constitute a larger fraction of the economy in recessions than in booms.
This, in turn, renders signals about the economy’s state more noisy in reces-
sions than in booms. As a consequence, the dynamics of beliefs and aggregate
1See Chalkley and Lee (1998) for a partial equilibrium analysis and Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2006) for an RBC model with procyclical learning. Similarly, Veldkamp (2005) and
subsequently Ordoñez (2009) argue that procyclical learning causes slow booms and sudden
crashes in asset markets.
2Methodologically, the idea of information choice is not novel. See Veldkamp (2011) for
a coverage of early and more recent models of information choice in macroeconomics and ﬁ-
nance.
2activity are characterized by fast declines and slow recoveries. In Veldkamp
(2005) asymmetric movements in lending rates are the result of more invest-
ment projects being undertaken in good than in bad times which generates
a procyclical number of public signals about the unknown probability of a
positive return. Slow booms and sudden crashes in asset markets occur as
investors face a small sample problem in bad times while learning quickly
about a change in the economy’s state during a boom.3 Similar to the idea
of a larger number of signals in good than in bad times in Veldkamp (2005),
the explanation for asymmetric movements in macroeconomic aggregates in
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) relies on procyclical learning as a
consequence of higher precision signals in booms than in recessions. In their
model, an additional additive shock to aggregate technology ensures that the
signal-to-noise ratio and thus learning is procyclical. All aforementioned pa-
pers, advocating procyclical learning as the source of asymmetric booms and
recessions, share three model features that separate them from our analy-
sis. First, agents in their models are assumed to be passive learners whereas
we allow them to choose whether to become informed, i.e. they are active
learners. Second, we allow for an informational role of prices, that arises nat-
urally in equilibrium with asymmetrically informed agents, a channel that is
however absent in the three papers.4 Third, public signals about aggregate
activity are constructed to be more informative in booms than in recession in
their models. In Chalkley and Lee (1998) only the high action, which ﬁrms
choose when being sufﬁciently conﬁdent that the economy is in the good state,
generates publicly observed information. Similarly, in Veldkamp (2005) the
precision of the public signal moves procyclically as the number of invest-
ment projects is, by construction, greater in booms than in recessions. In
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006), in turn, the variance of the aggre-
gate statistic is smaller in booms than in recessions due to the combination
of an additive and a multiplicative shock to aggregate technology. In con-
trast, our model does not rely on the construction of an asymmetrically in-
formative aggregate statistic. Rather, we analyze an economic environment
3Although the model in Veldkamp (2005) is primarily about asset markets instead of busi-
ness cycles, gradual booms and prompt crashes due to procyclical learning make it an inter-
esting and relevant reference for our analysis.
4It is an important and well known result that with asymmetric information at least some
agents will wish to reoptimize on their plans if learning from equilibrium prices is suppressed,
see e.g. the discussions in Grossman (1981) and Laffont (1989), chapter 9.
3where all exogenous, public information is acyclical. This combined with ac-
tive learning ensures that any variation in the precision of ﬁrms’ information
about the unknown state over the business cycle is the result of their infor-
mation choices. Our contribution to this literature is to show that learning
is weakly countercyclical rather than procyclical, once one allows for infor-
mation choice and the price system to transmit information. The learning
asymmetry found in our paper challenges the prevailing view of procyclical
learning as the source of asymmetric business cycles.
In our model, ﬁrms initially hold only imperfect information about the
aggregate technology level that varies as the economy moves between booms
and recessions. Prior to hiring labor in a perfectly competitive market, ﬁrms
choose whether to acquire a fully revealing signal about the economy’s true
state at some ﬁxed cost, and thus to learn the true technology level. An ad-
ditional endogenous signal is provided by the labor market clearing wage.
As the rational expectations equilibrium wage reﬂects ﬁrms’ employment de-
cisions, and ultimately the information they hold, it transmits information
from ﬁrms that have bought the fully revealing signal to those that have
not. In our model information acquisition is a strategic substitute. An in-
dividual ﬁrm’s expected gain from acquiring the costly signal decreases as
the fraction of informed ﬁrms increases. Demand for information and hence
the fraction of informed ﬁrms differ across booms and recessions, albeit only
slightly. When the economy has been in a boom in the previous period, and
ﬁrms enter the current period with an optimistic belief the fraction of in-
formed ﬁrms is smaller than when the economy has been in a recession and
ﬁrms share a pessimistic belief. However, learning is approximately acycli-
cal, as is the informational content of equilibrium wages. The approximate
symmetry of optimal learning arises from two interacting effects. First, ﬁrms
do not have substantially different incentives to acquire costly information
in booms and recessions. Second, learning from equilibrium wages lowers
the incentive to become informed equally in booms and in recessions. This
is due to uninformed ﬁrms being able to reﬁne their information about the
unknown state by observing the equilibrium wage. Due to this information
transmission, learning from equilibrium wages dampens any asymmetric in-
centives for costly information acquisition. Thus, ﬁrms’ incentives to acquire
information are more symmetric than without learning from wages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay
4out the model environment and describe the information structure together
with ﬁrms’ learning rule and the ordering of events. Section 3 deﬁnes and
analyzes equilibrium of the model. Here we show existence and uniqueness
of rational expectations equilibrium with costly information acquisition. In
Section 4 we present our main results: approximate acyclicality of both de-
mand for information and the informativeness of the price system. Section
5 discusses the role of learning from equilibrium wages in our model, and
illustrates attainability of rational expectations equilibrium beliefs. Section
6 concludes.
2 The model environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t ¸ 0. In each period the state of the econ-
omy is described by zt 2 Z Æ {z,z}, 0 Ç z Ç z, where z and z indicate a re-
cession, and a boom respectively. The evolution of the state zt is governed
by a Markov chain with time invariant and symmetric transition proba-
bilities. The persistence of the process is denoted with ½ 2 (1
2,1), where
½ ÆP(ztÅ1 Æ zjzt Æ z)ÆP(ztÅ1 Æ zjzt Æ z).
There is a measure-one continuum of ex ante identical ﬁrms, indexed by
i 2[0,1]. Firm i produces output yit employing labor hit, taking as given the
wage rate wt. The ﬁrm’s real proﬁts in period t are given by
¦it Æ yit¡wthit. (1)
The production technology of the ﬁrm exhibits diminishing returns to la-
bor and is hit by an aggregate technology shock that depends on the state of
the economy5
yit Æ ztlog(1Åhit). (2)
We close the model by introducing a representative household with pref-
erences represented by the following period utility function deﬁned over con-
sumption and leisure
U(ct,`t)Æ ctÅÁtlog(`t), (3)
5The log-speciﬁcation of ﬁrms’ production technology in (2) and of the representative house-
hold’s utility from leisure in (3) greatly simpliﬁes equilibrium analysis, in that it allows us to





, 0ÇÁÇÁ, features a uniform i.i.d. taste shock that
is independent of the state zt.6 The role of this aggregate supply shock, whose
realization is known to the household but unknown to ﬁrms, is to introduce
noise in the information revealed by the labor market clearing wage.7 As is
well known from Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), in the absence of unobserv-
able noise in labor supply, a competitive rational expectations equilibrium
with costly information acquisition would fail to exist. Moreover, since our
model addresses the information acquisition decision of competitive ﬁrms
rather than of the representative household, we assume that consumption
enters linearly in (3). Under that assumption, the household’s labor supply
schedule varies with the shock Át but remains unaffected by its belief about
the state. The household’s endowment of time is normalized to unity, that is
`tÅht ·1. Finally, the representative household owns all ﬁrms and ﬁnances
its consumption expenditures from labor income and aggregate proﬁts. The





This concludes the description of the physical environment of the model.
We now lay out the information structure of the economy and describe ﬁrms’
learning rule together with the ordering of events.
Information structure, learning, and ordering of events
In our model, the true state is a priori unknown to all ﬁrms by assumption.
However, ﬁrms are allowed to acquire a costly signal about the state prior to
choosing their proﬁt maximizing employment level. In addition to this costly
and exogenous signal, the labor market clearing wage will provide ﬁrms with
another costless and endogenous signal about the current state. Whenever
ﬁrms learn a new piece of information about the state, they update their
6As we seek to analyze the microfoundations of learning over the business cycle, our choice
of a state independent, uniformly distributed taste shock, together with the symmetric transi-
tion probabilities in the binary Markov chain, ensures that the source of any asymmetry does
not hinge on the speciﬁcation of the model’s stochastic environment.
7The introduction of unobservable noise in labor supply in our model corresponds to the
random asset supply assumption in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and many closely related pa-
pers, for instance Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Verrecchia (1982), Admati
(1985), and more recently in Ganguli and Yang (2009) and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp
(2009).
6belief in a Bayesian fashion. Since ﬁrms will hold different beliefs about
the state within a single period, we distinguish between the following three
stages.
Stage 1: Costly information acquisition. At the beginning of each period
the state zt 2 Z is drawn according to the Markov chain. Firms do not
learn the true state. Instead, they enter the period with a common prior
belief ¹t about the economy being in a boom, where P(zt Æ zjzt¡1) Æ
¹t derives from the Markov chain.8 All ﬁrms choose simultaneously
whether to acquire a perfectly revealing signal St 2 S Æ {S ,S } about
the state at a ﬁxed cost ·È0 that is equal across all ﬁrms and periods.
Reselling purchased information is not permissible. Firms that pay ·




1 if St ÆS ,
0 if St ÆS ,
(5)
where the superscript I identiﬁes ﬁrms that become informed.
Throughout the model ¸t 2 [0,1] denotes the fraction of ﬁrms that ac-
quire the costly signal in stage 1 and hold the updated belief ˜ ¹I
t. Ac-
cordingly, in each period there is a fraction 1¡¸t of ﬁrms that choose
not to observe signal St and keep their initial prior belief ¹t.9
Stage 2: Learning from the equilibrium wage. Firms enter stage 2 with
their endogenous belief about the state from stage 1. They maximize
expected proﬁts by choosing the optimal level of employment hit. Firms
take as given the real wage rate wt and account for any information
contained in the equilibrium wage about the state in their optimal labor
demand. In particular, uninformed ﬁrms revise their stage 1 belief ¹t
about the state to ˆ ¹U
t upon observing the equilibrium real wage wt. To
8The fact that ﬁrms share a common prior is not an assumption. At the end of each period
they learn the true state perfectly by observing their own output in (2) and exploiting their
knowledge of the symmetric transition probability. This yields a common prior belief at the
beginning of each period tÈ0.
9In the following, we will repeatedly refer to ﬁrms that acquire the costly signal as informed
ﬁrms, and those ﬁrms refraining from costly information acquisition as uninformed ﬁrms.
This is not entirely correct however, since the equilibrium wage contains noisy information
about the state and thus allows ﬁrms that do not acquire the costly signal to become informed
to some extent. However, no confusion should arise from our slight abuse of terminology.
7the contrary, informed ﬁrms do not revise their belief ˜ ¹I
t from stage 1, as
the equilibrium wage contains information about the state only in the
form of the exogenous signal St that informed ﬁrms already know. The
representative household privately learns the realization of the taste
shock Át and forms its labor supply hS
t to maximize expected period
utility. The labor market clears.
Stage 3: End-of-period learning. Informed and uninformed ﬁrms pro-
duce outputs yI
t and yU
t according to their employment decisions from
stage 2, and given the realized technology level from stage 1. The repre-
sentative household chooses consumption, and the goods market clears.
From observing their own output, uninformed ﬁrms can infer the true
zt perfectly. Next period’s common prior belief ¹tÅ1 obtains from perfect
knowledge of zt and the transition probabilities of the Markov chain
¹tÅ1 Æ
(
1¡½ if zt Æ z,
½ if zt Æ z.
(6)
For notational convenience we deﬁne the set of possible prior beliefs
as M Æ {1¡½,½}. As a consequence of perfect end-of-period learning,
information in the form of the costly signal has value only in the cur-
rent period. The information acquisition problem in stage 1 is therefore
purely static, as are the household’s and ﬁrms’ optimization problems
in stages 2 and 3. This allows us to drop the time subscript from the
next section on.
3 Equilibrium
We solve the model backwards, starting from equilibrium in the labor mar-
ket in stage 2, for a given fraction of informed ﬁrms.10 Then, we solve the
stage 1 information acquisition problem taking as given the distribution of
equilibrium outcomes in the labor market.
We solve for the labor market equilibrium using rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) under asymmetric information, based on the pioneering
10Given that the household does not have access to a storage technology, goods market equi-
librium in stage 3 is given by
R
yidi Æ c.
8work of Lucas (1972) and Green (1973).11 This equilibrium concept accounts
for learning from prices by imposing a consistency requirement on equilib-
rium beliefs. Namely, beliefs are required to be in line with any information
contained in the observed equilibrium wage. We show that in our model ra-
tional expectations equilibrium à la Lucas and Green exists and is unique.
3.1 Labor market equilibrium
Labor demand and supply schedules are found by solving the household’s
and ﬁrms’ maximization problems. The household solves its static utility
maximization in two steps. First, in stage 2, it chooses how much labor to
supply for a given wage and realization of taste shock, hS(w,Á). Then, in
stage 3, when labor income and proﬁts are realized, it chooses consumption.
For ¸ È 0, the equilibrium wage can reveal the signal S the informed
ﬁrms acquired. Hence, uninformed ﬁrms update their belief using any infor-
mation that may be contained in the equilibrium wage they observe. Letting





ˆ ¹U(w,¹)¦(w,z,hU)Å(1¡ ˆ ¹U(w,¹))¦(w,z,hU)
o
. (7)
The resulting labor demand of an uninformed ﬁrm is denoted by hU(w, ˆ ¹U).
Informed ﬁrms maximize expected proﬁts for a given wage, forming ex-




ˆ ¹I(w,¹,S )¦(w,z,hI)Å(1¡ ˆ ¹I(w,¹,S ))¦(w,z,hI)
o
, (8)
yielding hI(w, ˆ ¹I), the labor demand of an informed ﬁrm. Having laid out the
maximization problems of the agents, we can now deﬁne a rational expecta-
tions equilibrium in the labor market.
Deﬁnition 1 (Rational expectations equilibrium in the labor market). Given
a fraction of informed ﬁrms, ¸ 2 [0,1], rational expectations equilibrium in
11For surveys on extensions of rational expectations equilibrium to asymmetric information
see Radner (1979) and Grossman (1981).
12Informed ﬁrms do not learn anything new from the equilibrium wage, but we still write
their belief as a function of the wage to indicate that their belief is equally required to be con-
sistent with the equilibrium wage as formalized in (10). Similarly, the prior belief is redundant
as an argument due to the fully revealing nature of the costly signal.
9the labor market is a pair of demand schedules hU(w, ˆ ¹U) and hI(w, ˆ ¹I), a
supply schedule hS(w,Á) and a wage functional W¸(Á,¹,S ) such that for all
(Á,¹,S )2©£M £S and wÆW¸(Á,¹,S )
1. hU(w, ˆ ¹U) and hI(w, ˆ ¹I) solve the uninformed and informed ﬁrm’s proﬁt
maximization problem in (7) and (8), respectively;
2. beliefs are consistent with the realized wage w
ˆ ¹U(w,¹)ÆP(z Æ zjwÆW¸(Á,¹,S ),¹) (9)
ˆ ¹I(w,¹,S )ÆP(z Æ zjwÆW¸(Á,¹,S ),¹,S ) (10)
3. hS(w,Á) solves the household’s stage 2 problem;
4. labor market clears
(1¡¸)hU(w, ˆ ¹U)Å¸hI(w, ˆ ¹I)Æ hS(w,Á). (11)
The following proposition proves to be helpful in establishing existence
and uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium. In particular, we show that
the combination of uniform taste shocks and binary signals induces “all-or-
nothing” learning on part of the uninformed ﬁrms.
Proposition 2 (“All-or-nothing” learning from REE wages). The set of ratio-
nal expectations wages in the labor market can be partitioned into a set of
wages which perfectly reveal the signal S of the informed ﬁrms and a set of
wages which are perfectly uninformative about S .
















w ¡1 if wÇEi[zjw]
0 otherwise,
(13)
where Ei[zjw] denotes the expectation with respect to the equilibrium belief
ˆ ¹i(¢). For strictly positive equilibrium demands and supply13, market clearing
13A sufﬁcient condition for strictly positive equilibrium quantities is z¡z Ç z¡Á.
10in the labor market requires
(1¡¸)E[zjw]Å¸E[zjw,S ]Æ2w¡Á.14 (14)
First, note that the equilibrium wage can only contain information about
state z through the signal of the informed ﬁrms, S . This follows from the
informed and uninformed having identical information about z prior to in-
formation acquisition and Á being distributed independently of z. Thus,
E[zjw,S ]ÆE[zjS ].
To characterize the informativeness of wages, ﬁrst suppose S Æ S and
ÁÆÁ0 2©. Equilibrium wage wÆW¸(Á0,¹,S ) is determined by
(1¡¸)E[zjw]Å¸z Æ2w¡Á0. (15)
Note that if there does not exist Á00 2© such that
(1¡¸)E[zjw]Å¸z Æ2w¡Á00, (16)
then w can only obtain when S ÆS , hence perfectly revealing S . Otherwise,
w does not fully reveal S . Hence, for w not to fully reveal S , taste shock
Á0 and ¸ have to be such that Á0 ¡¸(z¡ z) ¸ Á. Similarly, for S Æ S and
Á Æ Á00 2 ©, if Á00Å¸(z¡z) · Á, the resulting equilibrium wage does not fully
reveal S . Otherwise, the uninformed can infer from the equilibrium wage
that S ÆS .
To show that not-fully-revealing wages are perfectly uninformative about





















¯ is not a function of S for not-fully-revealing
wages. Hence, from Bayes’ rule we obtain the following ratio of posterior













for w which does not fully reveal S . Thus, not-fully-revealing wages are
perfectly uninformative about S .
14Here and in the rest of this proof, we have suppressed the dependence of the expectation
of z on the prior belief ¹ for conciseness as none of the results depend on the prior belief.
11The above characterization allows us to construct the equilibrium wage
functional, in contrast to Grossman-Stiglitz type models, which rely on guess-
and-verify. Moreover, our approach permits us not only to establish the exis-
tence of equilibrium but also its uniqueness.
Proposition 3 (Existence and uniqueness of REE). Rational expectations
equilibrium in the labor market exists and is unique.
Proof. Note from the previous proof that whether an equilibrium wage w per-
fectly reveals S or is perfectly uninformative does not depend on the equilib-
rium belief of the uninformed, ˆ ¹U(w,¹). Thus, for each (Á,¹,S ) triplet: (1)
the resulting equilibrium wage is either perfectly informative or completely
uninformative and (2) the induced equilibrium belief of the uninformed is
either the prior belief or the belief of the informed. Consequently, for each




































3.2 Information acquisition equilibrium
Equipped with the unique REE wage functional, we can solve a ﬁrm’s infor-
mation acquisition problem in stage 1. A ﬁrm will acquire information at cost
· if the expected proﬁt of an informed ﬁrm exceeds that of an uninformed ﬁrm
by more than ·. Letting G(¸) Æ E[¦I(w,¸)j¹]¡·¡E[¦U(w,¸)j¹]15 to denote
the expected, prior-to-information-acquisition gain from becoming informed,
we deﬁne stage 1 equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition 4 (Information acquisition equilibrium). Given a rational expecta-
tions wage functional W¸(¢), information acquisition equilibrium is a fraction
15¦(¢) represents equilibrium proﬁt.
12of informed ﬁrms ¸¤ such that
¸¤ Æ
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if G(0)Ç0
1 if G(1)È0
¸¤ 2[0,1] if G(¸¤)Æ0.
(22)
A sufﬁcient condition for the equilibrium fraction of informed ﬁrms to be
unique is that the expected gain from becoming informed, G(¸), is strictly
decreasing in ¸. We show below that information acquisition is a strategic
substitute, i.e. the expected gain from becoming informed is indeed strictly
decreasing in the fraction of informed ﬁrms.
4 Results
We ﬁrst establish strategic substitutability in information acquisition for all
prior beliefs. Then, we turn to our main results, the approximate acyclicality
of demand for information and of the informativeness of the price system. We
ﬁrst show that ﬁrms have a stronger incentive to acquire information when
the economy has been in a recession in the previous period, and ﬁrms share a
pessimistic belief about the economy being in a boom than when the economy
has been in a boom and an optimistic belief prevails. As a consequence, the
equilibrium fraction of informed ﬁrms is higher and the price system more
informative when ﬁrms have a pessimistic belief than for an optimistic be-
lief. However, we then show that demand for information is approximately
acyclical, yielding no signiﬁcant variation in the fraction of informed ﬁrms
and the informativeness of the price system over the business cycle.
Proposition 5 (Strategic substitutability in information acquisition). Given
that for all ¸ 2 [0,1] there exists a non-degenerate interval of uninformative
wages, the expected gain from becoming informed is strictly decreasing in the
fraction of informed ﬁrms.
Proof. We want to show that the expected gain function satisﬁes G0(¸)Ç0 for
all (¸,¹) 2 [0,1]£(0,1). Given that for wages that fully reveal the signal of
the informed, the uninformed and informed ﬁrms make identical choices, the
gain from becoming informed prior to opening of the labor market pertains
to realizations of the signal and the taste shock which support uninformative
13wages. From (20) and (21) it follows that the lowest and highest uninforma-























































Let us consider parameter values which ensure strictly positive equilib-
rium quantities. Then, uninformed and informed ﬁrms’ proﬁts, for optimal
choices of labor and given w and z, are
¦U(w,z)Æ z(log(E[zj¹])¡logw)¡(E[zj¹]¡w), (28)
¦I(w,z)Æ z(logz¡logw)¡(z¡w), (29)
respectively. Expected gain from becoming informed is then found by inte-
grating the difference between the proﬁt of an informed and that of an un-


































and 0 otherwise. Note that the expected gain is equal to the
probability of observing an uninformative wage multiplied by the difference
14in expected proﬁts for a given wage, which is independent of ¸ and strictly
positive for ¹ 2(0,1) by Jensen’s inequality. Under the parameter restriction
Á¡ÁÈ z¡z the existence of a non-degenerate interval of uninformative wages
is guaranteed for all ¸2[0,1] and we have G0(¸)Ç0 as was to be shown.
In our model, strategic substitutability in information acquisition arises
from an information externality due to rational expectations equilibrium
wages transmitting information, similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). As
more ﬁrms acquire the costly signal and become informed about the econ-
omy’s state, the price system becomes more informative in terms of the proba-
bility of observing an informative wage in (27). An individual ﬁrm’s incentive
to acquire the costly signal is reduced. Hence, the expected gain of becoming
informed decreases in the fraction of informed ﬁrms.
We now turn to our two main results, approximate acyclicality of infor-
mation demand and of the informativeness of the price system, both of which
constitute novel ﬁndings in the literature on learning and asymmetric busi-
ness cycles. These results are stated in the following proposition and its corol-
lary.
Proposition 6 (Approximately acyclical information demand). Given that
the probability of observing an uninformative wage is strictly positive, the ex-
pected gain from becoming informed is higher for the low prior belief 1¡½
than for the high prior belief ½. However, up to a second-order approximation
the expected gain is the same for the low and the high prior belief.
Proof. The probability of observing an uninformative wage is independent of
¹. Hence, to show the countercyclicality of expected gain with respect to the
prior belief ¹, it sufﬁces to show that
g(¹):Æ¹zlogzÅ(1¡¹)zlogz¡E[zj¹]log(E[zj¹]) (31)
is such that g(1¡½) È g(½) for ½ 2 (1













2,1). Hence, g(1¡½)È g(½) for all ½ 2(1
2,1).





15Thus, the approximate expected gain from becoming informed is the same for
the low prior belief 1¡½ and the high prior belief ½.
To grasp the intuition behind this result consider a highly persistent pro-
cess for the aggregate technology, i.e. ½ close to 1. Then, as the prior belief is
either close to 0 or 1, we can ignore the gain from information which conﬁrms
the prior view. This is because conﬁrmatory information does not change the
optimal quantity of labor signiﬁcantly. Hence, we can focus on the gain from
receiving information contradicting the prior belief. First, consider the case
when the economy has been in a boom and ﬁrms hold an optimistic prior be-
lief. Now, the gain from contradictory information, which reveals the state to
be low, comes from the combination of two effects. On the one hand, it enables
the ﬁrm to reduce its production costs by hiring less labor than dictated by the
prior belief. On the other hand, this decrease in the quantity of labor hired
decreases the informed ﬁrm’s output relative to that of the uninformed ﬁrm.
Since the aggregate technology level is low, the output effect is dominated by
the cost reduction effect. In the alternative case, when the economy has been
in a recession and ﬁrms hold a pessimistic belief, these effects operate in the
opposite directions while the net effect is of similar magnitude. That is, al-
though the informed ﬁrm has higher labor input costs than the uninformed
ﬁrm, the output effect more than compensates for this as the aggregate tech-
nology level is high. In other words, perfectly revealing information allows
the informed ﬁrm to cut its losses when the prior belief is high and increase
its proﬁts when the prior belief is low.
Figure 1 illustrates how the expected gain from becoming informed varies
with the prior belief and Figure 2 shows that the higher-order terms of the
gain function only give rise to moderately countercyclical information de-
mand.
Weakly countercyclical information demand implies that, given · is such
that we have an interior solution for ¸¤, the fraction of informed ﬁrms is
higher for the pessimistic belief than for the optimistic belief. This, in turn,
implies that the probability of observing a perfectly revealing wage is higher
for the low prior belief than for the high prior belief, although only slightly as
demand for information is approximately acyclical. As equilibrium wages are
either perfectly revealing or perfectly uninformative, a straightforward mea-
sure of the informativeness of the price system is the probability of observing























































Figure 1: The solid line represents the expected gain from becoming informed
at ¸Æ0, G(0), for z Æ3, z Æ4 and ·Æ0 and the dashed lines corresponds to a
symmetric approximation of the expected gain.




















Figure 2: Fraction of informed ﬁrms ¸¤ as a function of z for z Æ 1, Á Æ 0.1,
ÁÆ0.5, ½ Æ0.9 and ·Æ0.001.
18an informative wage. Hence, from the preceding proposition we obtain the
following.
Corollary 7 (Approximately acyclical informativeness of the price system).
Given that the cost of the signal is such that an interior solution for the equi-
librium fraction of informed ﬁrms obtains, the price system is more informa-
tive when the low prior belief 1¡½ prevails than when the high prior belief
½ prevails. However, up to a second-order approximation of the expected gain
function, the informativeness of the price system exhibits acyclicality.
Proof. From g(1¡½) È g(½) as shown in the proof of Proposition 6 and from
Deﬁnition 4, for · such that ¸¤ 2 (0,1), the equilibrium fraction of informed
ﬁrms, ¸¤ is higher for the pessimistic belief than for the optimistic belief.
Then, by equation (27), the probability of observing an informative wage is
higher when the prior belief is 1¡½ than for prior belief of ½.
From the proof of Proposition 6, up to a second-order approximation, the
expected gain from becoming informed is the same for the prior beliefs of 1¡½
and ½. Hence, from Deﬁnition 4 and equation (27), the fraction of informed
ﬁrms and the probability of observing an informative wage are equal for these
two prior beliefs.
5 Discussion
In this section we ﬁrst delve deeper into the role of learning from equilib-
rium wages and examine how it relates to the approximate learning symme-
try established in Proposition 6. To study how ﬁrms’ incentives to acquire
information will change if learning from wages is suppressed, we consider
Walrasian equilibrium in the labor market, which does not require ﬁrms’ be-
liefs to be consistent with the observed wage16. We ﬁnd that suppressing
the informational role of wages results in a ﬁrm’s incentives for acquiring
information being no more affected by other ﬁrms’ information acquisition
decisions. Consequently, without learning from wages either all ﬁrms are in-
formed or no ﬁrm is informed. Therefore, learning from wages dampens any
asymmetric incentives to acquire information.
After having examined Walrasian equilibrium, a solution concept with
off-equilibrium beliefs, we turn to the question of how ﬁrms may come to
16We follow Grossman (1981) in referring to equilibrium which does not require beliefs to be
in line with the observed wage as Walrasian equilibrium.
19hold rational expectations equilibrium beliefs. To shed light on attainabil-
ity of equilibrium beliefs, we consider an equilibrium concept, introduced by
Kobayashi (1977) and Jordan (1982, 1985), where a sequence of wages is ob-
served and used to update beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. We ﬁnd that beliefs
and wages under this alternative equilibrium concept converge to their coun-
terparts in REE after observing a single Walrasian equilibrium wage.
5.1 The role of learning from wages
Let us begin by deﬁning an equilibrium concept which disregards learning
from wages, namely Walrasian equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 8 (Walrasian equilibrium in the labor market). Given a fraction
of informed ﬁrms, ¸ 2 [0,1], Walrasian equilibrium in the labor market is a
pair of demand schedules hU(w, ˘ ¹U) and hI(w, ˘ ¹I), a supply schedule hS(w,Á)
and a wage functional ˘ W¸(Á, ˘ ¹U, ˘ ¹I) such that for all (Á, ˘ ¹U, ˘ ¹I) 2 ª£[0,1]2
and wÆ ˘ W¸(Á, ˘ ¹U, ˘ ¹I)














2. hS(w,Á) solves the household’s stage 2 problem;
3. labor market clears for all realizations of Á
¸hI(w, ˘ ¹I)Å(1¡¸)hU(w, ˘ ¹U)Æ hS(w,Á). (36)
To ﬁnd the prior-to-information-acquisition gain from becoming informed
when the stage 2 labor market equilibrium is Walrasian, note from (28) and
(29) that the gain from becoming informed at any wage w is not a function of
w. Moreover, as there is no learning from wages, the expected gain from be-
coming informed is found by integrating over all possible equilibrium wages
and accounting for the cost of the signal
˘ G Æ¹zlogzÅ(1¡¹)zlogz¡E[z]log(E[z])¡·. (37)
20Comparison of (30) and (37) reveals that the expected gain from becoming
informed with learning from wages is equal to the gain when learning from
wages is suppressed, scaled by the probability of observing an uninformative
wage. Therefore, for · such that ¸¤ is strictly positive, learning from equilib-
rium wages moderates asymmetric incentives to acquire costly information.
Moreover, without learning from wages, depending on whether ˘ G is nega-
tive or positive, the fraction of informed ﬁrms is either 0 or 1. Thus, when
equilibrium in the labor market is Walrasian, there exists ·È0 such that all
ﬁrms are informed when the pessimistic belief prevails and no ﬁrm informed
when the public belief is optimistic, although the demand for information is
only weakly countercyclical. On the other hand, when learning from wages
is allowed, the fraction of informed ﬁrms differs only slightly across the two
possible public beliefs.
5.2 Attainability of REE beliefs
Our sequence of markets equilibrium, adopted from Jordan (1985), formalizes
what Vives (2008) refers to as information tâtonnement17. Firms express
their demand for labor, based only on their private information at the time.
Their demand schedules are aggregated and the notional18 market clearing
wage announced. Firms then update their beliefs using any information that
may be contained in the announced notional market clearing wage and adjust
their demand schedules to reﬂect their updated beliefs. Updated demand
schedules are collected and a new notional market clearing wage announced.
This process is allowed to continue until all ﬁrms no more wish to adjust
their demand schedule, which requires that ﬁrms’ beliefs are not altered by
the last market clearing wage. Our sequence of markets equilibrium builds
on Walrasian equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition 9 (Sequence of markets equilibrium). Given a fraction of in-









, a supply schedule hS(w,Á) and a
wage functional ˘ W¸(Á, ˘ ¹U
n , ˘ ¹I





n), hS(w,Á) and ˘ W¸(Á, ˘ ¹U
n , ˘ ¹I
n) constitute a Walrasian
equilibrium;
17See Vives (2008), pp. 334–335.
18Notional refers to the wage that would clear the market for the given supply and the
current demands. However, trades are not yet executed.
212. ˘ ¹U
0 Æ ˜ ¹U(¹), ˘ ¹I
0 Æ ˜ ¹I(¹,S ) and
˘ ¹U
nÅ1(wn,¹)ÆP(z Æ zj ˘ wn Æ ˘ W¸(Á, ˘ ¹U
n , ˘ ¹I
n),¹), (38)
˘ ¹I
nÅ1(wn,¹,S )ÆP(z Æ zj ˘ wn Æ ˘ W¸(Á, ˘ ¹U
n , ˘ ¹I
n),¹,S ); (39)
3. limn!1 ˘ ¹U
n Æ ˘ ¹U and limn!1 ˘ ¹I
n Æ ˘ ¹I.
In our model, rational expectations equilibrium beliefs are attainable via
observing and processing the information contained in a sequence of notional
Walrasian market clearing wages. This is formalized in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 10 (Attainability of REE beliefs). Sequence of Walrasian mar-
kets equilibrium beliefs and wages converge to their rational expectations
equilibrium counterparts after observing a single Walrasian equilibrium
wage.
Proof. Note from Proposition 2 that whether a REE wage is perfectly in-
formative or perfectly uninformative does not depend on the belief of the
uninformed, ˆ ¹U, but only on Á and S . Hence, in the ﬁrst step of the se-
quence of Walrasian markets, when the uninformed use only their prior be-
lief to formulate their demands, the informativeness of ˘ w0 is determined
by exactly the same conditions on Á as the informativeness of REE wages.
For the same reason, the uninformed cannot learn anything more from
˘ w1. Hence, the sequence of Walrasian markets wage functional satisﬁes
˘ W¸(Á, ˘ ¹U
1 , ˘ ¹I
1) Æ ˘ W¸(Á, ˘ ¹U, ˘ ¹I) Æ W (Á,¹,S ). That is, Walrasian equilibrium
wages in the ﬁrst step contain the same information as rational expectations
equilibrium wages.
6 Conclusion
We have investigated two so far unanswered questions in the literature
on procyclical learning as an explanation for business cycle asymmetries.
Namely, whether ﬁrms have a stronger incentive to acquire information in
booms or in recessions and how learning from prices contributes to aggre-
gate learning outcomes. We ﬁnd that in a model environment featuring no
exogenous source of asymmetry ﬁrms’ information demand is approximately
acyclical rather than procyclical. We also establish a crucial role for learning
22from equilibrium prices. The price system, in transmitting information from
the informed to the uninformed, moderates any asymmetric incentives in in-
formation acquisition. That is, irrespective of whether ﬁrms would have pro-
or countercyclical demand for information, the aggregate learning outcome is
less cyclical when ﬁrms exploit information contained in equilibrium wages
than when learning from wages is not taken into consideration. These two
novel ﬁndings suggest that models relying on procyclical learning to explain
slow expansions and sharp contractions require strongly procyclical, exoge-
nous information to survive the moderating effect of information acquisition
and learning from prices.
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